

Constrained Monarchs, Stable Bargains*

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Abstract

How do rulers with weak or non-existent bureaucracies distribute goods to remain in power and avoid conflict? Unlike their counterparts with robust bureaucracies, low-capacity autocrats face constraints when sharing power with elites. Rulers can overcome this and reduce elite rebellion by distributing goods that 1) are difficult to revoke and 2) provide sufficient rents back to the ruler once distributed. I argue that land meets these criteria. I test the rebellion-quelling effects of land grants in case of late medieval and early modern England (1226-1572) with three novel datasets: 600,000 charters and patents, rebellious counties from 32 civil conflicts, and 502 elites' grants and participation in the Second Barons' War. Elites who received land grants were less likely to join the rebels during the civil war, and counties were less likely to rebel immediately after receiving a land grant. Thus, even monarchs without bureaucratic buying power can build stable bargains.

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Introduction

“He who does not give what he has, will not get what he wants.”

- Henry III (A motto inscribed on his chess board.¹)

King Henry III asked his English nobles to approve a tax in 1237. He promised to heed his nobles’ advice on how to distribute the tax revenues. He did not follow through. The contemporary observer and historian Matthew Paris described the ensuing scene: “But without taking any advice of any one of the natural subjects of his kingdom, he gave it to foreigners to be carried abroad, and he became like a man bewitched, as if he had no sense. A murmur therefore arose amongst the people, and the indignation of the nobles waxed hot” (Giles, 1889, p. 67). One noble particularly objected to Henry III’s strategy. His brother Richard, the Earl of Cornwall, confronted Henry III, accusing him of distributing goods to elites “who were plotting against him and his dominions” (Giles, 1889, p. 68). The elite and familial uproar over the distribution of goods is a common tension and potential source of conflict, not just in medieval England, but in contemporary authoritarian regimes. To remain in power, autocrats must ask how they can distribute goods to satiate elite demands and prevent elite rebellion.

When bargaining over goods, elites want lucrative goods and goods that are difficult for the autocrat to revoke should he try to renege on the deal. Scholarship refers to this revocability aspect of a power-sharing bargain either as forming a credible commitment, transferring coercion, or generating a threat-enhancing effect (Stasavage, 2002; Blaydes and Chaney, 2013; Meng, 2019; Paine, 2021, 2022). This elite demand presents a tricky trade-off for autocrats. The autocrat can refuse to deal and fight the elite today. But fighting is costly, and victory is uncertain. Or the autocrat deals with the elite today and transfers lucrative, non-revocable goods to the elite to prevent immediate rebellion. Should he choose

¹(Brown et al., 1963, as cited in Southern (1983), p. 112)

this option, he emboldens the elite to challenge him tomorrow with a higher chance of dethroning him or asking for even more goods.

I argue autocrats can overcome this spiral of concessions by offering a set of ideal goods to elites. Specifically, autocrats can distribute goods that 1) are difficult for the autocrat to revoke, **and** 2) provide economic returns to the autocrat after the autocrat distributes the goods to elites. By distributing goods that generate economic returns once distributed, the autocrat ensures not only that he retains some power parity between him and the elite, but also gains assets for any future elite bargains.

Bureaucratic appointments meet both of these conditions. Appointing potential elite challengers to departments or ministries salaries the elites, empowers them with the coercive capacity of the state, and makes them employees working on behalf of the autocrat. From ancient Egypt ([Green, 2022](#)) to medieval China ([Chen, Wang and Zhang, 2024](#)) to post-colonial Africa ([Arriola, 2009](#)), autocrats have relied on bureaucratic appointments to share power with elites. But what if the autocrat lacks a robust bureaucracy or has low state capacity? Can those autocrats form stable power-sharing arrangements with elites?

Autocrats with weak bureaucracies must distribute other goods. Autocrats can turn to land as a substitute. Depending on the quality and nature of the land, land provides rents to elites and is difficult for autocrats to claw back once granted ([Blaydes and Chaney, 2013](#); [Blaydes and Paik, 2016](#); [Kokkonen, Møller and Sundell, 2022](#)). Land grows crops, houses livestock, provides labor via tenants, and contains minable minerals. Those same features make it difficult for an autocrat to revoke the grant. Crops feed troops, tenants are conscriptable, minerals are malleable into weapons, and pastures are defensible. But crucially, land provides future economic returns for the autocrat ([Boucoyannis, 2021](#); [Pengl and Roessler, 2026](#)). Land, and its output, provide taxable products for the autocrat or a direct share of extracted resources that the autocrat alone cannot extract from land. This paper examines bureaucratically constrained monarchs who rely on land grants to form

stable power-sharing arrangements with elites. Specifically, I examine the case of medieval and early modern England.

I build off the premise from [Blaydes and Chaney \(2013\)](#) that feudalism and other medieval institutional structures rely on land distribution to increase ruler stability. I directly compare land grants to other types of concessions and explain why land is particularly beneficial for promoting stability, given the difficulty of revocability and the economic returns for the autocrat. Empirically, Blaydes and Chaney compare European monarch tenures before and after the advent of feudalism in Europe, finding that feudal monarchs ruled longer than non-feudal ones. My empirical strategy differs. I directly measure land grants distributed to elites and how elites respond to the grants. These data enable me to directly test the role of land as a stable power-sharing instrument, as opposed to conducting an indirect test based on larger institutional changes like the fall of the Carolingian Empire ([Blaydes and Chaney, 2013](#)) or the rise of parliaments ([Van Zanden, Buringh and Bosker, 2012](#); [Stasavage, 2020](#)).

To test if distributing land can reduce elite rebellion, I collect and hand-categorize all 25,128 grants Henry III distributed to elites from 1226 to 1272. These grants come from two medieval administrative sources *The Calendar of the Charter Rolls (CChR)* and *The Calendar of the Patent Rolls (CPR)*. I then manually match each grant to an original dataset of 498 elites who participated in the large-scale civil war during Henry III's reign: the Second Barons' War (1264 to 1266). In addition to identifying if a specific elite rebelled against Henry III or remained loyal, I collect the family relation of the elites to Henry III and other personal characteristics. With the grants elites received leading up to the civil war and their rebellion status, OLS results show that elites who received land were less likely to join the rebellion against Henry III. The results remain when taking into account the total amount of non-land grants an elite received and hold through multiple robustness tests. Notably, through placebo tests on the impact of non-land grants on rebellion likelihood, grants that are solely non-revocable and grants that solely produce high economic returns to the monarch do not

impact rebellion probability.

To increase the external validity of the elite-level results, I conduct a secondary analysis on manors and castles granted to individuals in English counties from 1226 to 1572 (i.e., from Henry III to Elizabeth I). From 110 volumes and over 600,000 grants and patents from the *CChR*, *CPR*, and *Letters and Papers of Henry VIII (LP)*, I collect and geocode thousands of manor and castle grants to 39 historic English counties. I pair the county-level manor and castle dataset with a final novel dataset on 32 civil conflicts to determine which counties participated in the rebellions against the English Crown. Results from a staggered difference-in-differences design at the county level show that counties where individuals received manor grants from the Crown were less likely to rebel against the monarch in the years immediately following the grant, but the effect wanes over time.

This paper makes three key contributions to the state development in historical Europe literature and the autocratic power-sharing literature more broadly. First, this paper provides theoretical and empirical support for instruments of autocratic power-sharing beyond bureaucratic appointments. A growing body of work on post-colonial and modern African autocracies focuses on cabinet position distribution forming stable bargains between elites and autocrats ([Arriola, 2009](#); [Arriola, DeVaro and Meng, 2021](#); [Ricart-Huguet, 2021](#); [Pengl and Roessler, 2026](#)). Scholarship on historical China shows that certain types of bureaucratic appointments ([Chen, Wang and Zhang, 2024](#)) and specific types of elites and bureaucrat networks ([Wang, 2022](#)) can also reduce elite rebellion. However, this paper shows that autocrats operating in weak capacity states or autocrats with minimal bureaucracies leverage alternative goods (e.g., land) to assuage elite ambition. Bureaucratic appointments are a subset of goods from a larger set of theoretical goods that reduce elite rebellion by transferring coercive capacity to elites, while generating rents for the autocrat.

Second, both the elite-level and county-level findings add to the scholarly understanding of ruler stability in historical Europe. Work on ruler stability in Europe often focuses

on institutional arrangements, rather than the non-institutionalized behavior of monarchs themselves: the impacts of the onset of feudalism after the fall of the Carolingian Empire (Blaydes and Chaney, 2013), family size (Kokkonen et al., 2021), number of sons a monarch has (Acharya and Lee, 2019), succession rules (Kokkonen, Møller and Sundell, 2022), and ruler competence (Ottinger and Voigtländer, 2025). This paper joins work like Blaydes and Paik (2016), which examines the state-building effects of the decision of European elites and monarchs to join the Crusades, focusing on monarch or elite strategic decisions and their consequences.

Finally, it provides the first micro-level, quantitative evidence that land, land ownership, and land distribution were crucial to the political economy of elite rebellion in medieval England and Europe more broadly. The findings also buttress larger claims and theories of state stability in Europe (Stasavage, 2002; Blaydes and Chaney, 2013) and general theories of autocratic power-sharing (Meng, 2019; Paine, 2021, 2022), all while providing a general theoretical framework applicable to modern autocracies with weak state capacity and valuable land.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. First, I introduce a general theory of power-sharing goods and explain how autocrats distributing varying types of goods may or may not prevent elite rebellion. Next, I outline the empirical setting of medieval England and the types of goods at the monarch’s disposal. The first empirical test examines the distribution of land during the reign of Henry III in the lead-up to the Second Barons’ War where I introduce an elite-level dataset of rebels and royalists during the civil war. The second empirical test examines land distribution from the reign of Henry III to Elizabeth I.

A Theory of Power-Sharing Goods

The monarchical distribution (i.e., power-sharing) logic follows a general bargaining game framework between a monarch and a single, representative elite.² The monarch wishes to remain the monarch. The elite wants the throne for himself. The elite could launch a costly rebellion against the monarch, but success is not guaranteed. Since elite victory is not certain, the elite is open to getting bought off by the monarch. The monarch also remains uncertain about his chances of victory. To avoid losing a rebuff of elite ambition and the costliness of conflict, the monarch offers the elite just enough goods to keep the elite indifferent between rebelling and remaining placid.

Distributing any type of good does not necessarily mean the elite will not rebel against the monarch. The elite is uncertain if the monarch will renege on the bargain, so the elite prefers to receive a good that he can protect from future confiscation and that is difficult for the monarch to revoke.³ Monarchs can provide difficult to revoke goods to elites through institutions or directly through goods themselves (Meng, Paine and Powell, 2022). Institutional mechanisms include agenda-setting in a deliberative body like parliament or the establishment of advisory councils with veto power over the monarch, like the Provisions of Oxford in 1258 England (see background on the Second Barons' War below). A difficult to revoke good involves giving elites or other actors some coercive capability, like letting a rebel group retain their arms (Fearon and Laitin, 2007). In the case of medieval England, monarchs sometimes granted permissions for elites to build fortifications around their manors and castles. The improvement immediately benefits the elite's property values, while fortifying against future monarchical attacks since the improvement itself defends the elite.

However, only providing difficult to revoke goods to elites creates an issue for the monarch. Giving away coercive goods to prevent immediate rebellion reduces the monarch's ability to

²See Appendix A for a formalized model.

³Formal theoretical work on autocratic power-sharing refers to this as the threat-enhancing effect (Paine, 2021, 2022).

fend off rebellion in the future, while increasing the elites' ability to challenge the monarch in the future. Distributing solely non-revokable, coercive goods would put a monarch on an endless cycle of concessions until he owns less than the elite or the elite accumulates sufficient assets to overthrow the monarch. Distributing a difficult to revoke good then is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a stable power-sharing arrangement.


The monarch needs a way to retain assets, while still satisfying elite demands. He can do this by distributing goods that, when distributed, generate an economic return for the monarch. Exclusive licenses or monopoly rights are the clearest examples of goods that provide economic returns for the monarch when distributed. The monarch is not a merchant. He does not personally know trade routes, commodity prices, or production conditions. Holding the sole right to export or produce goods to himself does not benefit the monarch. However, once distributed to merchants, those merchants leverage their new privileged market position to generate profits, which the monarch taxes. Both parties gain rents otherwise not possible unless the monarch distributes the license.

But distributing goods that solely provide some economic return to the monarch does not reduce rebellion. Without some non-revocability guarantee to prevent a confiscation of the good, the elite will refuse a monarch's bargain and immediately rebel. In the case of exclusive licenses, a swift revocation destroys a merchant's ability to produce or export at all. This is a large loss to one individual merchant, but a minor inconvenience for the monarch. Thus, monarchs must offer goods that: 1) are difficult to revoke, and 2) provide economic returns to the monarch, to form stable bargains with elites.

Figure 1 shows a variety of goods at an autocrat's disposal and where they could sit along these two conditions, though the context of a general good category varies from regime to regime. Across time, region, and regime, one of the most common goods autocrats could distribute while transferring difficult to revoke power and providing economic returns to the autocrats is government appointments. Modern autocrats in Africa ([Arriola, 2009](#); [Arriola,](#)

(DeVaro and Meng, 2021; Ricart-Huguet, 2021) and emperors in ancient and medieval China (Wang, 2022; Chen, Wang and Zhang, 2024) relied on this strategy, giving elite access to powerful parts of the state to check the autocrats' power and preferences. Cabinet members, ministers, and senior officials manage departments, collect taxes, and organize military troops all to the benefit of the monarch and beyond the monarch's personal capacity in exchange for salaries or rents tied to state extraction. Also, high-ranking bureaucrats' proximity to the coercive apparatuses of the state allows them to credibly threaten the monarch should the monarch threaten to revoke their appointments (Chen, Wang and Zhang, 2024).

Figure 1: Stylized Power-Sharing Goods Options



Lacking the robust bureaucracies of ancient China or modern regimes disadvantages

monarchs trying to bargain with elites. However, other goods are difficult to revoke while providing economic returns to monarchs. Land provides both. Land grows crops to feed troops, houses conscriptable tenants, contains mineral deposits, and insulates elites with physical or constructed barriers from state military forces. Land, and the goods it produces, provides taxable assets for autocrats or a direct share of extracted resources. Should autocrats own enough land to distribute, land distribution to elites can yield similar stabilizing effects as bureaucratic positions. Thus, autocrats without robust or functioning bureaucracies can still reduce the odds of elite rebellion with land as an alternative power-sharing instrument. Based on this substitute possibility, I pose the following hypothesis: H_1 : *The distribution of land from an autocrat to an elite decreases the probability the elite rebels.*

A Case: Henry III and Medieval England

Below makes the case for why the reign of Henry III, and medieval England generally, serves as a fertile setting to test the rebellion-quelling effects of land distribution in an environment where autocrats lack bureaucracies to bargain with elites.

Constrained Bureaucracy, Copious Land

Bureaucrats earn wages. Wages require cash. Getting cash was a challenge for Henry III and other medieval European monarchs. [Strayer \(2005\)](#) paints a dire fiscal-liquidity picture of European monarchs, “No ruler could raise an army of more than a few thousand men, nor could he keep such an army in being more than a few months” (p. 27). Liquidity issues were not a monarch-specific problem. Though some monarchs’ purse strings were looser than others, it was a macroeconomic problem. As [Mann \(2012\)](#) puts it, the medieval economy did not allow monarchs to generate enough “liquid wealth” to fund military endeavors with overwhelming mercenary forces, much less sustain permanent robust bureaucracies. And

even then, monarchs often turned to wealthy elites and family members for loans when they required large amounts of liquid funds (e.g., Henry III of England asked his brother for a £10,000 loan for a national recoinage ([Carpenter, 2020](#), p. 464). Simply put, European rulers were “cash-strapped” ([Blaydes and Chaney, 2013](#)).

Lack of cash infected monarchs’ bureaucratic capacity, but it was also a symptom. In general, medieval European state capacity did not only sit far below the capacities of modern-day Africa, but also historical states like Song China (1086 AD) or Abbasid Iraq (850 AD) ([Stasavage, 2020](#)). England was a slight outlier among its European counterparts, having well above average levels of state capacity. But even in England, the number of bureaucratic positions that would qualify to transfer legitimate and powerful coercive capacity from the monarch to the elite was limited for the 13th, 14th, and the first half of the 15th centuries. For example, during the reign of Henry III, when elites raised potential reforms to rein in monarchical power in 1244, they singled out only two bureaucratic positions, the Chief Justiciar and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that they wished to be subject to elite approval ([Carpenter, 2020](#), p. 453). Even in England, there were not enough meaningful positions to satiate elites.

Cashless and lacking bureaucratic positions, Henry III and European monarchs turned to alternative goods to bargain with: grants and charters. Of all the charters and grants European monarchs distributed, land dominated vellum parchments because land is difficult for the monarch to take back and is lucrative for the elite ([Blaydes and Chaney, 2013](#); [Blaydes and Paik, 2016](#); [Kokkonen, Møller and Sundell, 2022](#)). Land provides elites with food, labor through serfs, steady rents from tenants, space for sheep to graze to manufacture commodities like wool to sell in international markets,⁴ access to streams to build mills, men to take up arms, enough revenue to outfit expensive knights, etc.

Rather than a mere outflow of power from the monarch to the elite, land grants, at least

⁴This applies specifically to medieval England ([Moore, 1993](#)).

in the English case, provided benefits back to the monarchs as well.⁵ [Boucoyannis \(2021\)](#) notes that English monarchs distributed land to elites under strict conditions in exchange for elite military service (i.e., fees knight), judicial service, tax revenue (or at the very least the ability to petition the elite for taxes when the monarch convened parliament), and the ability to offer loans to and receive loans from the elite. Land distribution also increased the monarch's legibility into the taxable assets of the recipients. A monarch would reasonably know the value of the asset he grants, which partly derives from the grant's productive capacity. Land grants often characterize the value of land in pounds sterling and require yearly fees to be paid by the recipient at the Exchequer. Should Parliament approve a monarch's national tax, the knowledge of the value of the initial grant transfer can help confirm expected revenue from that asset if that asset falls under the national tax.⁶

Even after distributing the land, English monarchs retained some minor control over the new landowners. Recipients of land in England could not sell their land without royal permission until 1327. Even after 1327, elites were still subject to fines and licenses ([Boucoyannis, 2021](#), p. 243). Certain alterations to land required monarchical approval, like imparking land and crenelating castles and manors. The conditional nature of land transfers also allowed English monarchs to issue exemptions to recipients for fines or political benefits. In short, land grants were difficult to revoke but still generated benefits for the monarch, at least in the short-run.

Table 1 shows example land grants and government positions Henry III distributed during his reign. Land grants varied from pasture land to meadows to castles to manors. Notably, land grants often explicitly contained future expectations for benefits back to the monarch. In the land grant of a manor to Robert de Dammeneville in 1227 and to Richard of Cornwall in 1235, Henry III made the grant with the expectation of future service of knights, should

⁵Some scholars explicitly argue that transfers of land financially weakened European monarchs ([Blaydes and Chaney, 2013](#)).

⁶[Pengl and Roessler \(2026\)](#) make a similar argument in the context of bureaucratic positions distributed to elites with lucrative, taxable cash crops in colonial Africa.

he require military forces. The government positions Henry III distributed were often local and minor compared to autocrats with departments and ministries to fill. Positions range from named positions in central government to county-level agents like sheriffs to granting powers for individuals to do something on behalf of the king (i.e., inquire about a murder).⁷

Table 1: Example Land Grants and Government Positions

Source	Year	Type	Grant
<i>CChR</i>	1252	Land	Gift to Agnes de Roudun, late the wife of Geoffrey de Sancto Mauro, of all the land in Chipenham, which James Huse holds for his life of the king's bail, and of the king's new street (vicum) called Horscroft with the meadow and other things [...]
<i>CChR</i>	1227	Land (Manor)	Grant to Robert de Dammenevill, heir of Adam de Dammeneville, and his heirs, of the manor of Betton, to hold by the service of one knight, as freely as the said Adam held it from king Henry the king's grandfather, pursuant to & charter of king Richard.
<i>CChR</i>	1235	Land (Castle)	Gift to Richard, count of Poitou and Cornwall, the king's brother, and his heirs by his espoused wife, of the manor of Knarreburgh and the castle and honour thereof, to hold by the service of a fee of two knights, remainder to the king and his heirs.
<i>CPR</i>	1237	Government Position	Appointment, until Whitsunday, of Master William de Kylkenny as the king's proctor in the court of Rome.
<i>CPR</i>	1246	Government Position	Appointment, during pleasure, of Godfrey de Lyston to the keeping of the forest of Windlesor, in all counties.

See Appendix B for coding criteria for and more examples of land, manors, castles, and government positions.

Not only were typical bureaucratic positions minor, Henry III distributed few. Figure 2 shows the proportion of total grants distributed in a year that contained land and government positions. In the first five years of Henry III's reign, nearly two out of every five grants distributed land, whereas he hardly made any bureaucratic appointments. For each year of his reign, bureaucratic appointments remained less than ten percent of the grants distributed. From 1226, Henry III distributed 25,128 grants via charters and patents. Just 1,190, or

⁷This is an intentionally liberal definition of government positions. See Appendix B for grant type coding instructions and inclusion criteria.

4.7 percent, of those grants distributed a government position. Conversely, 1,886, or 7.5 percent, of those grants distributed some type of land to recipients. The low frequency of appointments to bureaucratic positions shows that at best, Henry III did not rely on government positions for power-sharing arrangements, and worst he could not rely on them.

Figure 2: Proportion of Land and Government Position Grants from Total for Henry III



Author's calculation from all grants from *CChR* and *CPR* for Henry III.

Personalistic Regime

Henry III's personal motto and his distributional practices led historians to categorize his regime as personalistic and one of excessive patronage (Church, 2017; Carpenter, 2020, 2023). Years before Simon de Montfort led other earls and barons to coerce oversight on Henry III in 1258, elites expressed concerns over Henry III's distributional behavior. In 1244, Henry III asked parliament to grant him permission to collect taxes to support his foreign military

campaigns. In response, members of parliament put forward a document known as the “Paper Constitution.” The document listed conditions Henry III must accept to receive his tax. Elites demanded four parliament-elected individuals to a council that handled state affairs, acted as a judge to those seeking dispute resolution, managed the king’s treasury, oversaw the spending of the tax, and summoned parliament ([Carpenter, 2020](#), p. 455). Importantly, the demands required two council members to be permanent members of the king’s court, and only parliament could dismiss council members. Effectively, elites were asking for veto power over most of the monarchical decisions, including the distribution of grants. Henry III rejected these demands.

While not implemented, the elite demands of the Paper Constitution show just how poignant some elites’ concerns over Henry III’s distributions were. Henry III’s rejection of those demands, his forgoing of the tax he wanted, and continuation of his distribution of grants show that his willingness and ability to pursue his own power-sharing strategy were unencumbered by institutional controls before 1258. When considering an empirical analysis of the efficacy of land grant distribution on reducing rebellion, knowing Henry III was relatively unrestrained increases our confidence that land grant distributions were not biased by other non-royal actors.

Second Barons’ War

The armed conflict of the Second Barons’ War (1264-1266) officially commenced 47 years after the end of its prequel, the First Barons’ War (1215-1217), which famously ended in the reissue of the Magna Carta. And like the First Barons’ War, the Second Barons’ War was a conflict between English elites and the reigning monarch. Unlike its predecessor, the period leading up to the Second Barons’ War saw formal changes to the de facto and de jure control of royal government. Control of the state switched between Henry III and his disgruntled barons six times in an eight-year span (see [Figure 3](#)).

Tensions formally began in June 1258 when seven armed elite confederates confronted Henry III. They pressed him for a more active role for the baronry in royal decision-making beyond what they proposed in the Paper Constitution ([Ambler, 2019](#), p. 169). The Simon de Montfort led threat formed two agreements: the Provisions of Oxford and Provisions of Westminster. In those provisions, Henry III and the barons created a new council to advise the king on his orders. The council controlled by Montfort and his allies could veto Henry III's distribution of grants, patents, and charters ([Jobson, 2016](#), p. 34). Each time Montfort and the council were in control, they would exercise similar powers over the affairs of the state.⁸


The arrangement lasted three years. In December 1261, Henry III, moved to retake control of the government with support from domestic elites and military aid from continental European elites. Henry III's aggression, mixed with gifts to mollify disgruntled barons, resulted in Henry III regaining power and Montfort sailing back to his homeland, France ([Jobson, 2012](#), p.69-71). The barons and Montfort made another attempt to reestablish council control in July 1263. Henry III quickly resisted. Both parties turned to King Louis IX of France to help settle the dispute. Louis IX ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the crown and Henry III retook control of the government. Finding the settlement and their loss of influence on the levers of government unsettling, Montfort and his baron allies rebelled. The Second Barons' War officially began in April 1264.

Montfort and the barons won a decisive first victory at the Battle of Lewes in May 1264, where they took Henry III's son, Prince Edward (future King Edward I), hostage. With his forces defeated and progeny at risk, Henry III once again ceded control to Montfort and his council. Henry III regain control only after Edward escaped from captivity and led a

⁸An example of this control shift appears in an October 1258 *CPR* grant, "Proclamation of the king's will that whatever is ordained by the council, or the greater part of them elected by the king and the commonalty of the realm, shall be established for ever ; and all persons are commanded to maintain the same, and not to take any land or moveable whereby this can be endangered ; and if any go against this he is to be held as a public enemy ; and that this be firm and established..."

successful counter-campaign, culminating in the death of Simon de Montfort and other key rebels at the Battle of Evesham in August 1265. After putting down the remaining rebellious elites, the conflict finally ended in December 1266 with the Dictum of Kenilworth.

Figure 3: Timeline of English State Control and Rebellion (1226 - 1267)



Beyond Henry III's constrained bureaucracy, copious land grants, and personalistic approach to power-sharing, examining his reign and elite uprising has three empirical benefits. First, the Second Barons' War is one of the few English medieval conflicts where historians have comparatively decent information on which elites sided with the rebellious barons and which elites remained loyal to the crown. Second, the conflict involved a large number of elites and counties across England. Grievances did not concentrate geographically, like many other English medieval conflicts (e.g., Jack Cade's Rebellion in 1450, the Yorkshire Rebellion in 1489, the Rising of the North in 1569). Twenty-seven of 39 counties participated in the Second Barons' War (See Appendix C). For comparison, the second most widespread elite-driven rebellion by county was the Lollard Rebellion (1414). Only nine out of 39 counties rebelled during the Lollard Rebellion. Third, due to the changes in control of the government between the monarch and rebels before, during, and after the official rebellion commenced, we get direct insights into which types of goods both sides prioritized distributing once in power.

Elite-Level Analysis

To test hypothesis H_1 , I examine the decision of elites to join Simon de Montfort’s rebellion in the Second Barons’ War by constructing a novel dataset of 502 earls, barons, and other English gentry; the grants they received prior to the war; and their loyalty status once the war began.

Elite-Level Data

Rebels. To construct the dataset of elite rebels and royalists, I collect a list of elites during the Second Barons’ War from [Blaauw \(1871\)](#). [Blaauw \(1871\)](#) catalogues the rebelling, neutral, and royalist status for 575 English elites. [Blaauw \(1871\)](#)—and his editor after Blaauw died—compile the list of elites from various historical sources: chronicles from contemporary historians (e.g., Matthew Paris), genealogical records, lawsuits, judicial proceedings, and records of confiscated property of rebels after the war (e.g., distribution of rebel property in the *CChR* after Henry III quelled the rebellion). After the exclusion of elites for whom [Blaauw \(1871\)](#) was uncertain of their rebel/royalist status and for whom I could not definitively ascertain their rebellion status, 498 elites remain: 134 royalists and 363 rebels.

Land Grants. To determine if an elite received grants from Henry III and what types of grants they received, I collect and hand-categorize all 3,732 charters from the *CChR* and 21,628 letters patent from the *CPR* issued by Henry III between January 1226 to December 1266.⁹ I then code each charter into 27 distinct categories. I consider charters or letters patent land grants if the document transfers any form of physical property from the monarch to a given recipient. This includes, but is not limited to, grants of manors, castles, meadows, farmland, forests, religious buildings, and noble titles covering large areas. From this general category, I generate two narrow classifications of land grants, manors and castles, which

⁹See Appendix B for a visual example of a charter and its late 19th-century translation and transcription.

record the specific number of those types of land grants given to a recipient. A single land grant can contain grants of multiple manors or castles. I select these two subtypes for their economic and military importance (Desierto and Koyama, 2025, 2026), as well as the ability to accurately geolocate these grants to counties for the county-level analysis. After excluding vacated or damaged grants,¹⁰ I then categorize the type of recipient (See Appendix B for recipient coding rules) and then match the grants given to secular individuals to the elites extracted from Blaauw (1871).

Due to incongruent naming conventions (Blaauw (1871) uses anglicized versions of elite names, while the *CChR* and *CPR* often use gallicized versions of elite names) of elites between sources, in lieu of fuzzy matching approaches to link elites to grants, I manually verify each grant recipient to a potential royalist or rebel. To do this, I rely on the contextual information of the grants themselves. Grants have dates, locations if the good is geography-specific, and descriptions of the recipient (e.g., “the younger” or “the elder”). I also rely on elite personal information from Blaauw (1871), like noble titles and counties associated with elites, to match elites to grants. Finally, to supplement the contextual information from the grants and personal information from Blaauw (1871), I use the complete English peerage (Cokayne, 1898) and the Dictionary of National Biography (Stephen and Lee, 1900). The Dictionary of National Biography contains biographies on noble and famous individuals from Great Britain, which, in conjunction with the English peerage, helps distinguish between similarly named elites and match elites to their respective charters.

Finally, on the date the government issued the charter, I then classify the grant to its specific period of government control (see Figure 3 above) and whether the grant was distributed before the date of official conflict onset in April 1264.

Alternative Explanations. Along with the elites’ rebel/royalist status and the goods distributed, I construct a series of variables on individual characteristics that might also

¹⁰Trimming 25,360 total chartes and patents to 25,128 remaining grants.

drive an elite's decision to rebel, as well as their propensity to receive goods from the crown. I collect nobility rank from [Blaauw \(1871\)](#), if the elite was a close family relative of Simon de Montfort, a close family relative of Henry III,¹¹ and if the elite was one of the original confederates in 1258 from [Ambler \(2019\)](#). For elite-level summary statistics, see Appendix C.


Elite-Level Results

The rebellion-quelling impact of land grant distribution, but not necessarily grants in general, appears clearly in two descriptive exercises. Figure 4, which corresponds to the timeline of government control in Figure 3, shows a large disparity in the total number of grants distributed during Henry III's reign, leading up to the Provision of Oxford between eventual rebels and royalists.¹² Once Montfort and the council took control in June 1258 and gained veto power over royal decisions, grant distribution came to relative parity, but with future royalists still receiving the majority of grants during this period.

¹¹Close family members include: mother, father, grandfather, grandmother, uncle, aunt, great uncle, great aunt, sister, brother, wife, husband, son, daughter, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, nephew, niece, and cousin.

¹²Of the 498 elites in the sample, rebels outnumbered royalists just shy of three to one (363 rebels to 134 royalists).


Figure 4: Total Grants Distributed to Elites (1226 - 1268)



However, turning to land grants, the gap between future rebels and royalists widens. Figure 5 shows that no future rebels received a far smaller proportion of the total land grants Henry III distributed. Immediately upon receiving say over the distribution of grants, the Montfortian Council gave the majority of land grants to future rebels. To further support the pattern, after Henry III's first restoration via the Treaty of Kingston, all land grants Henry III distributed went to future royalists. For the first three periods of control, whenever a faction controlled the distribution powers of the state, those who received land grants nearly always sided with their distributor's faction once conflict broke out.¹³

¹³Figures C1 and C2 show similar patterns for manor and castle grants.

Figure 5: Manor and Castle Grants Distributed to Elites (1243 - 1268)



While Figures 4 and 5 show a stark pattern of land grant distribution and future rebellion, I construct a linear probability model (LPM) to account for the variety of other grants distributed and alternative explanations for elites' rebellion decision. Specifically, I estimate the following two LPM models.

$$y_i = \alpha + \hat{\beta}_1 Land_i + \mathbf{X}_i + \mathbf{G}_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

$$y_i = \alpha + \hat{\beta}_1 Manor_i + \hat{\beta}_2 Castle_i + \mathbf{X}_i + \mathbf{G}_i + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

The binary outcome variable y_i indicates if an individual (i) rebelled in April 1264. I define the principal independent variables as: $Land_i = (\text{Land Grants} | C)$, $Manor_i = (\text{Manors} | C)$, $Castle_i = (\text{Castles} | C)$, where $C = \text{Crown Control, Jan. 1226 - Apr. 1264}$. The conditional nature of the independent land variables, when Henry III made sole distribution,

ensures that the impact of land grants on elite rebellion against Henry III directly connects to his distribution decisions, not those of Montfort.

A vector of controls $\mathbf{X}_i$ controls for plausible alternative explanations for both receiving a land grant and joining the rebellion: earl status, member of Henry III's family, member of Simon de Montfort's family, and if the elite was an original baron confederate instigating the Provision of Oxford in 1258. To account for other grants, G_i measures the other goods distributed by Henry III to elites while he controlled the government before the conflict.¹⁴ Finally, the error term is ϵ_i .

Table 2 below confirms the patterns present in Figure 5. Columns 5 and 6 present the most robust results for elite rebellion, considering both a binary and continuous operationalization of grant distribution. The binary treatment specification should have the largest coefficients, as this is the more intense treatment specification. Notably, manor and castle grants do not appear to decrease the probability of rebellion under the most robust specifications for either the binary or continuous measure. This is likely due to fewer instances of manor and castle grants compared to land grants generally. Though there are discrepancies between the treatment specifications, the LPM results provide, at the very least, suggestive evidence that monarchs can distribute land grants to quell elites from rebelling.

¹⁴The variable includes grants of: land alterations; pardons of crimes; pardons of service; tax relief; marriage approvals; monopoly rights; rights to hold markets, fairs, and festivals; government positions; church positions; military positions; noble titles; rights to alienate property; free warren; protection; cash; policing power; goods and chattles of felons; denization; commissions; wardships; bonds and loans; misc. goods; and demands. See Appendix B for specific coding definitions and examples.

Table 2: Land Grants and Probability of Elite Rebel Status

VARIABLES	Continuous Treatment					
	Joining Rebellion		Joining Rebellion		Joining Rebellion	
Land Grant(s)	-0.0407*** (0.00609)		-0.0474*** (0.0125)		-0.0289** (0.0131)	
Manor(s)		-0.0323*** (0.00901)		-0.112* (0.0665)		-0.0126 (0.0747)
Castle(s)		-0.0460** (0.0212)		-0.0264 (0.0459)		-0.0482 (0.0472)
Observations	498	498	498	498	498	498
R-squared	0.032	0.022	0.039	0.035	0.051	0.049
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Grants	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
VARIABLES	Binary Treatment					
	Joining Rebellion		Joining Rebellion		Joining Rebellion	
Land Grant	-0.311*** (0.0901)		-0.303*** (0.0957)		-0.238** (0.107)	
Manor		-0.207 (0.142)		-0.231 (0.144)		-0.125 (0.158)
Castle		-0.307 (0.198)		-0.251 (0.260)		-0.233 (0.232)
Observations	498	498	498	498	498	498
R-squared	0.030	0.019	0.048	0.033	0.053	0.044
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Grants	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Treated - Land Grant	32		32		32	
Treated - Manor/Castle		16/7		16/7		16/7

Controls include binary indicators for: earl status, member of Henry III's family, member of Simon de Montfort's family, and if the elite was an original baron confederate instigating the Provision of Oxford in 1258. Other grants include either a binary indicator (for the binary treatment specifications) for at least one of the following grants or a continuous count (for the continuous treatment specifications) of the following grants: land alterations; pardons of crimes; pardons of service; tax relief; marriage approvals; monopoly rights; rights to hold markets, fairs, and festivals; government positions; church positions; military positions; noble titles; rights to alienate property; free warren; protection; cash, policing power; goods and chattles of felons; denization; commissions; wardships; bonds and loans; misc. goods; and demands. Clustered standard errors by elite ID are in parentheses where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.

Elite-Level Robustness Tests

Outlier Elites. Since grants, particularly land grants, were concentrated to a small portion of the sample of 498 elites in the dataset, a major empirical concern is that specific elites drive the results. While the inclusion of elite characteristic controls and other grants partially ameliorates this concern, as a robustness test, I re-run the main analysis 498 times, each time dropping one elite. Figures C3 and C4 in Appendix C show coefficients and standard errors after leaving out each elite for both the binary and continuous measure of land grants. The exercise retains the main results in Table 2.

Market, Fairs, and Festivals and Land Alterations. It is possible that other grants produce other rebellion quelling effects, but are captured in general control variable for total other grants received. I run two placebo tests for a non-revocable good in grants to make land alterations and a revocable, but one that produces economic returns for the monarch in grants to hold markets, fairs, and festivals. While controlling for land grants and other grants beside land alterations and markets, fairs, and festivals, neither land alteration grants or grants to hold markets, fairs, or festivals decrease the probability an elite rebels. See Appendix Table C4. This suggests that only grants that are both non-revocable and provide future economic returns back to the monarch, like land, form stable power-sharing arrangements.

County-Level Analysis

While these results are encouraging, an investigation of elites during the Second Barons' War alone is not sufficient to make general conclusions of the impact of land distribution on power-sharing in medieval England, let alone to Europe more broadly. Henry III's reign as a unique outlier of excessive patronage makes an individual-level analysis empirically attractive, but limits generalizability. To address this, I collected two additional county-level novel datasets: one on all civil conflicts within England from 1232 to 1572 and one on all grants distributed from monarchs to elites, geocoding grants to historic English counties when possible. I then leverage the county-level data to perform a difference-in-differences analysis.


County-Level Data

Distributed Goods. To construct the county-level dataset on distributed goods, I expand on the data collected for the individual-level analysis and collect and code grants from all 76 volumes of the *CPR* and all six volumes of the *CChR*. Additionally, I collect and code all grants from the 28 volumes of the *LP*. Henry VIII's administration phased out the recording of grants in the *CChR* and migrated all grants to the *CPR*. However, the records of grant distributions during most of Henry VIII's rule are in separate volumes that contain grants that would have been in the *CChR* and *CPR* and grants from the Book of the Court of Augmentations (grants to monks after Henry VIII dissolved monasteries).

Figure 6 shows the sources of distributed grants during the late medieval and early modern period in England and the number of grants extracted from each source. In total, the records span 110 volumes with over 600,000 total charters and patents. The green highlighted grants and years are included in the county level analysis, while the remaining grants are undergoing

final geocoding checks.¹⁵

Figure 6: Grant Data Collection as of March 2026



I geolocate castle and manor grants to their specific historic English counties.¹⁶ Often, entries will contain the name of the county the parcel of land is in. However, many grants during the reigns of Henry III to Edward III contain manor names and no county indicators. To geocode these grants, I compile a complete list of all 22,026 manors with mentions or documentation in the British National Archives¹⁷ and manually cross-reference manors mentioned in the grants with manors in the complete manor list, along with administrative records mentioning a specific manor name in the British National Archives during the reign the monarch distributed the grant.¹⁸ I repeat a similar procedure for grants of markets, fairs, and festivals for county-level placebo tests in Appendix E.

Monarchs distributed grants not just to individuals but to towns, religious institutions, merchants, etc. For each grant, I categorize the type of recipient. To generate results comparable to the elite-level analysis of the Second Barons' War, the county-level results only consider grants to secular individuals.

Rebellions. For the county-level outcome variable, I collect monthly data on 32 unique civil conflicts in England to construct a novel dataset on English rebellions from 1226 to 1572

¹⁵The majority of land-based grants (i.e., castles and manors) were recorded in the *CChR* prior to the reign of Henry VIII who switched to his own documentation scheme. After Henry VIII, monarchs record all grants in the *CPR*.

¹⁶Historic English counties were the 39 administrative units established by the Normans throughout the 1100s, often following the borders of the Anglo-Saxon administrative units: hundreds and shires.

¹⁷See here <https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/browse/c/manor/A>

¹⁸See Appendix B for specific geocoding procedures.

across the 39 historic English counties. In total, England experienced 1108 county-months or 198 county-years of civil conflict between 1226 and 1572.

For each civil conflict, I geolocate from which historic English counties the rebellion drew support, employing a variety of military scholarship and works by English historians and medievalists. Generally, scholars consider a county as rebellious in a particular conflict if: the county produced a mass of individual rebels, formally indicated hostility to the crown, and/or contained land accessible to rebelling elites. No doubt, counties varied in their vigor of aggression when they rebelled. However, due to limitations on the details of some conflicts, I code rebellious counties dichotomously. Appendix D houses a complete list of civil conflicts and rebellious counties included in the sample. Appendix D also contains a validation exercise comparing this dataset to existing datasets on English rebellions in the late medieval/early modern period.

Alternative Explanations The county-level analysis controls for other goods distributed to county (i.e., grants of permission to hold markets, fairs, or festivals to account for compound treatment effects) and rebellion in the previous years. The estimates also consider a county's exposure to foreign conflicts. Grants sometimes mention the reason the monarch distributed a good. Many grants in the *CChR* cite destruction from conflicts with Wales, Scotland, or other international foes like France as the reason for the distribution of the grant. A charter from Henry IV on March 19, 1401, to the citizens of Carlisle in Cumberland shows this type of aid-like distribution.

...Grant also, of further grace, with the assent of the council, in aid of the great cost and labour incurred by the citizens owing to sudden fire and in defending their city against the raids of the Scots that for the next ten years the citizens shall have jurisdiction to hold pleas of debt, detinue of chattels, account, covenant and trespass before the mayor and bailiffs of the city by plaint in their courts touching contracts and trespasses arising in the said city and its suburb...

Source: *CChR Vol. 5 - 15 Edward III to 5 Henry V, A.D. 1341-1417*

To construct this control of exposure to international conflict, I designate whether a given English county borders Wales, Scotland, or the southern coast. Then I generate an interaction term with an additional variable if England was at war with France, Wales, or Scotland. I generate this variable by identifying each year of English international conflict via [Kokkonen and Sundell \(2020\)](#); [Dupuy and Dupuy \(1977\)](#); [Phillips and Axelrod \(2005\)](#); [Kohn \(2013\)](#) and then identifying the antagonist for each international conflict. Thus, a southern coastal county in a year of international war with France is coded as exposed, but in years of international peace, it is not considered exposed. The variable considers exposure in the previous time period, as appealing to the crown for relief was not an immediate process. Appendix D contains the full list of international conflicts in the dataset and a validation exercise comparing this measure with existing measures of English international conflict.

County-Level Two-Way Fixed Effects Event Studies

I run two binary treatment, non-absorbing, staggered two-way fixed-effect analyses and related event studies à la ([Liu, Wang and Xu, 2024](#)) to gauge the impacts of manor and castle grants on county-level rebellion. A county is considered treated with a manor or castle grant if a monarch distributes a manor or castle in a given county to an individual recipient. Rather than the unit of analysis gaining a parcel of land, like in the elite analysis, it gains a new owner.

Further, the analyses make three measurement assumptions:

1. All geolocated grants last for 10 years.
2. All grants reset when a new monarch comes to power.
3. Binary grant measurements, derived from continuous measures, rely on a 90th percentile cutoff for treatment consideration.

The longevity and duration of grants vary from grant to grant. Some grants of land automatically transfer to heirs upon the recipient’s death. Other grants last for the recipient’s life. And other grants last for explicit periods of time. While the majority of grants in the dataset last for the recipient’s lifetime, no comprehensive information exists on recipient deaths to generate unique endpoints for each grant recipient. Due to this limitation, I make the conservative estimate that geolocatable grants last 10 years (i.e., treatment turns off after 10 years unless another grant is given in the same county). This is likely a conservative measurement strategy, as individuals likely survived far beyond 10 years after receiving the grants. Additionally, I assume that the autocrat-elite bargain resets with each new monarch. Monarchs often reconfirm grants made in previous reigns at the beginning of their own rule, but there is no guarantee that a monarch will renew any particular grant or that it requires renewal. Finally, to generate binary treatment variables from continuous measures, the 90th percentile cut-off translates into a county considered treated with at least 2 manor grants or at least one castle grant.¹⁹ I relax all three measurement assumptions in Appendix E. The findings remain directionally consistent and primarily retain statistical significance.

Each event study controls for year and county fixed effects, while controlling for plausible alternative explanations like previous rebellions in the county and exposure to international conflict. Each event study (i.e., manor or castle) controls for the other land grant type and other grants geolocatable to counties (i.e., market, fair, and festival grants).


County-Level Summary Statistics and Suggestive Evidence

For an intuitive sense of the relationship between manor and castle grants and county-level rebellion, Figure 7 shows a timeline of the 39 English counties, their treatment status, and whether they rebelled in a given year for 1226 to 1331. Monarchs distributed far more manor

¹⁹These cutoffs are more conservative than the “at least one” cutoffs for binary treatment variable measurement in the elite-level analysis.

grants than castle grants between 1226 and 1331. The denser the treated units are in years of non-rebellion, and the less dense treated units are in years of rebellion, indicate a rebellion quelling effect for land distribution. While manor grants were distributed to about half of all rebelling counties in the Second Barons' War and the Rebellion of the Marches (the two conflicts show), the density of manors seems greater in non-rebellion years. Castle grants follow an interveted pattern. While counties that rebelled hardly received castle grants, there were many periods of non-rebellion where counties did not receive castle grants. Thus, it does not appear immediately clear whether manor or castle grants quelled rebellion, though manor grants seem to form denser areas around non-rebellion years than castle grants.

Figure 7: Time of Counties Receiving Land Grants and Rebellion




County-Level Results

Figure 8 below shows the event plots for the two-way fixed-effect analyses for the impact of manor and castle grants on the probability of county rebellion.²⁰ With null pretrends for both manor and castle grants, there is suggestive evidence of post-treatment parallel trends.

Beyond the null pretrends, two notable patterns emerge. First, only manors appear to quell rebellion, though not immediately and only in the short-term. As elites take time to reap the financial gains from newly granted manors, the delay in rebellion quelling effects reflects the time it takes to ask for the grant, receive the grant, visit the property, and sell multiple harvests. Second, unlike manors, castle grants do not appear to significantly reduce the probability the county rebels after an elite is assigned the grant. Though directionally, the estimates suggest a temporary rebellion quelling story in counties where an elite receive a castle grant. The potential rebellion-quelling effect appears even more immediately than manor grants. This is likely a result of elites acting as rebellion quelling agents towards the populace on behalf of the monarch directly after receiving a castle grant.

²⁰Appendix E houses sample panel views of when counties enter and exit treatment.

Figure 8: Impact of Land Grant Distribution on County Rebellion



County-Level Robustness Tests

Market, Fair, and Festival Grants Placebo Test. The main results may suffer from issues of compound treatment effects from other grants distributed to elites. Though results control for market, fairs, and festival grants, if the theoretical claims that goods need to be both non-revocable and provides economic returns to the monarch, then this non-land controls should not have a rebellion-quelling effect. To see if this is the case I run another difference-in-differences analysis on the distribution of grants that embolden the recipient to hold markets, fairs, or festivals. Markets, fairs, or festivals produce revenue for the organizer and the monarch often taxes that revenue. In this sense, the grants produce economic returns for the monarch, but could quickly be revoked. Figure E6 shows that market, fair, and festival grants have brief negative impact on the probability of county rebellion in the second period after distribution, but the impact quickly becomes null in all subsequent periods. This placebo test alone would cast doubt on land grants being unique in their rebellion quelling effect, but recall the elite-level placebo test with both market, fair, and festival grants and land alteration grants did not impact elite rebellion probability. The two placebo tests combined provide weak evidence to support land grants' unique power-sharing effects.

Henry III Specific Results. Though the main analysis accounts monarch specific condition via year-fixed effects, certain monarchs and their excessive distribution or frequent rebellions could suggest that a rebellion-quelling effect of land distribution only applies to some periods and some reigns during in England. Figure E7 examines county-level results for Henry III's reign specifically to make explicit comparisons between the elite-level analysis and county-level analysis. The Henry III county-level results mimic the broader county-level results, show that manor grants to an elite in a given county reduce the probability that county rebels in the short to medium term.

Conclusion

On a summer evening in 1258, Henry III's barge got caught in a thunderstorm. Rather than sailing through the storm, he docked at the Bishop of Durham's home on the River Thames. Upon learning of the king's arrival, Simon de Montfort, bounded down to greet the king. According Matthew Paris, when greeted by Montfort, Henry III responded, "I fear thunder and lightning beyond measure; but by God's head, I fear you more than all the thunder and lightning in the world" ([Church, 2017](#); [Giles, 1889](#)). Montfort and thunder should not have been Henry III's only fears. He should have shuddered at each English elite he spurned when distributing land grants.

Henry III, like his medieval contemporaries and present day authoritarian bedfellows, face constant threats from elites. To quelling these threats, autocrats can offer elite concessions. However, not any concession will do. Autocrats must offer goods that 1) are difficult for the autocrat to revoke, and 2) provide economic returns to the autocrat after the autocrat distributes the goods to elites. In the case of medieval England, due to weak bureaucratic capacity, monarch could not rely on a common concession – bureaucratic appointments. They relied on land: land is difficult to revoke and a taxable asset.

Examining the case of individual elite rebels and royalists during the Second Barons' War (1264-1266), I find that elites who received land grants, but not other types of grants, were less likely to rebel against Henry III. These results hold when expanding to a county-level analysis of all manor and castle grants from the 17 English monarchs ruling from 1226 to 1572. Though constrained by their bureaucracies, English monarchs still managed to form stable power-sharing arrangements via land grants.

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Appendix for Monarchical Distribution

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Appendix A - An Illustrative Formal Model

Model Set Up

Consider a two-player, complete information, single-period bargaining game where a Monarch (M) offers a percentage of his holdings of good $x \in [0, 1]$ to a unitary Elite (E). After observing the offer, E makes a decision to fight a costly rebellion against M. Fighting incurs a cost that destroys a portion of the total benefits $(1 - \kappa)$ where $\kappa \in [0, 1]$. The game ends after E makes the decision to rebel or remain peaceful.

Offering x engenders three separate effects: a redistributive effect, a power-shifting effect, and a fiscal gains effect.

Redistributive Effect. M's offer of x to E represents a transfer of goods. After the offer, M is left with $(1 - x)$. In isolation, this effect motivates M to give out as little x as possible to E. The larger the offer, the smaller M's payoff.

Coercion-Shifting Effect. M's offer of x to E also represents a transfer of coercive capacity. The main text refers to this as revocability. E has a baseline probability of winning a rebellion ($\underline{\phi} \in [0, 1]$) and M has the complimentary probability $(1 - \underline{\phi})$ of thwarting the rebellion. Should M offer E any value of $x > 0$, then E's probability of winning a rebellion jumps discontinuously from $\underline{\phi}$ to $\bar{\phi}$. The odds of E winning a rebellion after receiving the offer of $x > 0$ is always greater than $x = 0$: $0 \leq \underline{\phi} < \bar{\phi} \leq 1$. The larger the discontinuous jump from $\underline{\phi}$ to $\bar{\phi}$ the more coercive capacity M shifts to E through the offer. In short, $\bar{\phi}$ represents the coercive capacity of the good. The larger $\bar{\phi}$, the greater the odds M falls to a rebellion.

Fiscal Gains Effect. An offer of a fiscally valuable x increases M's payoff in times of peace. Offers of fiscally valuable goods to E open up a range of future kickbacks and benefits to M. Fiscal gains do not represent a polity's GDP. Rather they represent the fiscal benefits available to only M, potentially at the economic detriment of non-elite actors. Some examples include access to men for international military campaigns, future tax revenue, and loans from elites. M's fiscal gains are a function of the baseline levels of the economy ($\alpha \in [0, 1]$), the offer to E (x), and the fiscal value of the good ($\epsilon \in [0, 1]$). Both the baseline levels of the monarch's fiscal capacity and the fiscal value of the goods are exogenous. M only controls the size of the offer x , not what type of x to offer.


Mechanically, the fiscal gains M receives from offering goods to E is a strictly increasing, weakly convex function: $\pi(x; \alpha, \epsilon)$. More specifically, $\frac{d}{dx} \geq 0$ and $\frac{d^2}{dx^2} \geq 0$. While the baseline fiscal levels (α) act as a scalar, ϵ influences the shape of the fiscal gains function. Holding the offer constant, $\frac{\partial}{\partial \epsilon} > 0$, meaning that as ϵ increases, so does M's overall fiscal gains.²¹

The introduction of the **Fiscal Gains Effect** produces scenarios where M prefers to offer more goods than necessary to keep the elite indifferent, which deviates from existing power-sharing models (e.g., Meng, 2019; Paine, 2022). M can offer more than necessary to keep E indifferent, even considering the **Coercion-Shifting Effect** and the payoff loss from the **Redistributive Effect**. Goods with larger ϵ values provide larger fiscal benefits to M.

Figure A1 shows the sequence of actions and payoffs for both the Monarch and the Elite.

²¹These restrictions on $\pi(x; \alpha, \epsilon)$ allow for interior maximum in M's peacetime payoff function.

Figure A1: Sequence of Play and Payoffs



Equilibria: Elite Indifference and Monarchical Returns

Following standard bargaining models consider the below incentive compatibility constraint for E.

$$\begin{aligned} EU_E(\text{Peace}) &\geq EU_E(\text{Rebellion}) \\ x &\geq \underline{\phi}(1 - \kappa) \end{aligned}$$

For E to not rebel, M needs to make an offer x that is greater than or equal to the baseline probability E wins the rebellion ($\underline{\phi}$) but pays the costs of rebellion ($1 - \kappa$). As the cost of rebellion decreases, E's payoff from rebelling also increases, making the price of indifference x higher. Similarly, as the baseline probability of winning a rebellion increases for E, the amount of x M must offer E to remain peaceful increases. If rebellion is easy and E is strong, the higher the offer M must make to keep E peaceful.

The model has three unique SPNE, the first anchors around E's incentive compatibility constraint with one minor alteration.²²

$$x_i^* = \bar{\phi}(1 - \kappa)$$

Since M offers E a positive value of x , $\underline{\phi}$ becomes $\bar{\phi}$. To avoid rebellion, M's offer x_i^* must be sufficiently large that the benefit of the offer (**Redistributive Effect**) must overshadow E's now increased capacity to win a rebellion (**Coercion-Shifting Effect**). This equilibrium, while not standard in typical bargaining models (Rubinstein, 1982; Fearon, 1995; Wagner, 2000), is standard in power-sharing models that include some variants of the **Coercion-**

²²See below for all relevant proofs.

Shifting Effect (Meng, 2019; Paine, 2021, 2022; Meng, Paine and Powell, 2023).

The second equilibrium deviates from standard bargaining and power-sharing models. The **Fiscal Gains Effect** produces an incentive for M to not just make an offer to satiate E, but to maximize his fiscal gains. To do this, M maximizes his utility under peacetime. Taking the First Order Condition of $EU_M(Peace)$ yields,

$$\begin{aligned} \max_x E[U_M(Peace)] &= \pi(x; \alpha, \epsilon)(1 - x) \\ x_s^* &= 1 - \frac{\overbrace{\pi(x; \alpha, \epsilon)}^{\text{Total Fiscal Gains}}}{\underbrace{\pi'(x; \alpha, \epsilon)}_{\text{Growth Rate}}} \end{aligned}$$

In this equilibrium, M offers a value of x_s^* which is a function of the total amount of goods available (1) minus a ratio of the total fiscal gains and its, called growth rate. As this ratio gets smaller, the equilibrium offer of x_s^* increases. As the size of ϵ increases, meaning as the fiscal gains of the good increases, the larger the offer gets. Conversely, as the size of ϵ decreases, the smaller the offer gets. In this case, it is more valuable for M to hold onto goods with less fiscal gains potential.

Finally, there is an equilibrium when M prefers a rebellion. In this case, M offers $x_r^* = 0$. When M desires a rebellion, he wants to ensure that he has the best odds of winning. The below equation compares M's payoffs if rebellion happens when he offers $x > 0$ and when he offers $x = 0$.


$$\begin{aligned} (1 - \bar{\phi})(1 - \kappa)\pi(\alpha) &< (1 - \underline{\phi})(1 - \kappa)\pi(\alpha) \\ (1 - \bar{\phi}) &< (1 - \underline{\phi}) \end{aligned}$$

Since $\underline{\phi} < \bar{\phi}$, then offering $x = 0$ is always preferable than $x > 0$ when M wants a rebellion. By offering nothing to E, M can avoid the **Coercion-Shifting Effect**.

While all three equilibria are feasible, M might find x_i^* or x_s^* optimal under different conditions. Figure A2 shows M's expected payoff for both x_i^* or x_s^* and imposes a strictly increasing and weakly convex functional of $\pi(x; \alpha, \epsilon) = \alpha x^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}}$ for the **Fiscal Gains Effect**.²³ M's optimal choice in equilibria for higher values of ϵ is to offer x_s^* to E: when the light blue line is above the magenta line. The **Fiscal Gains Effect** increases with the value of ϵ . In cases of goods with extremely high ϵ values, M earns more in future fiscal gains by offering x than he does by offering the minimal amount to make E indifferent. For lower values of ϵ , the offer that maximizes M's peacetime payoff is not sufficient to keep E indifferent, so M must offer E's indifference condition: when the magenta line is above the light blue line.

²³This functional form adheres to restricts of the type of function $\pi(x; \alpha, \epsilon)$ can be, a strictly increasing and weakly concave function where $\frac{\partial}{\partial \epsilon} > 0$.

Figure A2: Comparison of $EU_M(Peace)$ at Different Equilibria



M prefers to play x_i^* or x_s^* under the following conditions still supposing $\pi(x; \alpha, \epsilon) = \alpha x^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}}$.²⁴ Intuitively, the below optimality conditions follow the same logic as Figure A2. For smaller values of ϵ , $EU_M(x_i^*) > EU_M(x_s^*)$. For larger values of ϵ , $EU_M(x_i^*) > EU_M(x_s^*)$.

$$EU_M(Peace) \begin{cases} x_i^* & \text{if } \frac{\alpha(\frac{\epsilon}{1+\epsilon})^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}}}{1+\epsilon} > \alpha(1 + (\kappa - 1)\bar{\phi})(\bar{\phi} - \kappa\bar{\phi})^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}} \\ x_s^* & \text{if } \alpha(1 + (\kappa - 1)\bar{\phi})(\bar{\phi} - \kappa\bar{\phi})^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}} > \frac{\alpha(\frac{\epsilon}{1+\epsilon})^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}}}{1+\epsilon} \end{cases}$$

Empirical Implications

The equilibria on their own do not provide much insight as to when one should expect conflict between M and E. Depending on the good's **Coercion-Shifting Effect** and **Fiscal Gains Effect**, rebellion might be preferable to peace. As stated above, M offers $x_r^* = 0$ in cases of rebellion, as offering anything would lower M's ability to thwart a rebellion. Comparing M's peacetime strategies, x_i^* or x_s^* to M's rebellion provocation strategy $x = 0$, helps identify when one should expect a rebellion.

For explicit comparisons, I impose the same functional form for M's fiscal gains employed above to show M's optimal equilibrium: $\pi(x; \alpha, \epsilon) = \alpha x^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}}$. Invoking an explicit functional form here provides two key advantages to leaving the fiscal gains function implicit: 1) I can express the cutoff points for peace and rebellion under the x_i^* and x_s^* equilibria in terms of known exogenous parameters, and 2) I can visualize what types of goods (i.e., goods with different **Coercion-Shifting Effects** ($\bar{\phi}$) and **Fiscal Gains Effects** (ϵ)) result in peace or rebellion.

The two following propositions outline the explicit cutoffs for when one should expect rebellion. Proposition 1 is when M prefers not to offer a value of x that is greater than or equal to E's indifference condition. In this case, the x value necessary to buy off E is too high for M. M is better fighting than giving away E's reservation value.

Proposition 1. *The monarch does not satisfy the elite's indifference condition and rebellion occurs when $(\kappa - 1)(\bar{\phi} - 1) \geq \frac{(\frac{\epsilon}{1+\epsilon})^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}}}{1+\epsilon}$.*


Proposition 2 shows when the offer that maximizes M's gains from fiscal gains is not higher than M's payoff from fighting a rebellion.

Proposition 2. *The monarch's fiscal gains are not large enough to prefer peace when $(\kappa - 1)(\bar{\phi} - 1) \geq (1 + (\kappa - 1)\bar{\phi})(\bar{\phi} - \kappa\bar{\phi})^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}}$.*

Figure A3 maps the combination of these two propositions by a good's coercive capacity ($\bar{\phi}$) and fiscal capacity (ϵ). The light blue, magenta, and purple areas represent when rebellion will occur, while the white areas represent peace. The light blue areas represent when M's payoff from a rebellion is greater than his payoff from the offer x_s^* . The magenta area indicates when M's payoff is larger than offering E his indifference value x_i^* . The purple region marks when M's payoff for rebellion is larger than offering either x_i^* or x_s^* .

²⁴Playing x_r^* always results in $EU_M(Peace) = 0$ and is not substantively of interest.

Figure A3: Rebellion in Equilibria Outcomes



$$\phi = 0.65, \kappa = 0.55, \alpha = 1$$

$$\text{Cyan: } EU_M(\text{Rebellion}) \geq \pi(x_s^*)(1 - x_s^*)$$

$$\text{Pink: } EU_M(\text{Rebellion}) \geq \pi(x_i^*)(1 - x_i^*)$$

$$\text{Purple: } EU_M(\text{Rebellion}) \geq \pi(x_s^*)(1 - x_s^*) \text{ and } \pi(x_i^*)(1 - x_i^*)$$

Each region of Figure A3 maps what outcome one should expect from M's offer of goods with any given coercive and fiscal gains capacity. Offers of goods with lower fiscal gains potential and transfer little to no coercive power to E should result in rebellion. One should expect rebellion from the offer of goods with high coercive power, but little fiscal gains potential. Only offers of goods with high fiscal gains potential for M and medium to high coercive power to satisfy E result in peace.

Proofs

Proof. To establish that x_s^* is a maximum of $EU_M(Peace)$, x_s^* needs to be a critical point of a concave function.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \max_x E[U_M(Peace)] &= \pi(x; \alpha, \epsilon)(1 - x) \\
 &= \pi(x; \alpha, \epsilon) - x\pi(x; \alpha, \epsilon) \\
 \frac{d}{dx} &= \pi'(x; \alpha, \epsilon) - \pi(x; \alpha, \epsilon) - x\pi'(x; \alpha, \epsilon) \\
 x_s^* &= 1 - \frac{\pi(x; \alpha, \epsilon)}{\pi'(x; \alpha, \epsilon)} \\
 &\text{and} \\
 \frac{d^2}{d^2x} &= \pi''(x; \alpha, \epsilon) - \pi'(x; \alpha, \epsilon) - \pi'(x; \alpha, \epsilon) - x\pi''(x; \alpha, \epsilon) - \pi(x; \alpha, \epsilon) - x\pi'(x; \alpha, \epsilon)
 \end{aligned}$$

Since $\pi(x; \alpha, \epsilon)$ is an strictly increasing and weakly convex function, then $\pi''(x; \alpha, \epsilon) \geq 0$ and $\pi'(x; \alpha, \epsilon) > 0$. Therefore, so long as

$$\pi''(x; \alpha, \epsilon) < \pi'(x; \alpha, \epsilon) + \pi'(x; \alpha, \epsilon) + x\pi''(x; \alpha, \epsilon) + \pi(x; \alpha, \epsilon) + x\pi'(x; \alpha, \epsilon)$$


x_s^* is a maximum. □

Proof. To establish Prop 1 and Prop 2, establish the explicit maximum of $EU_M(Peace)$. Taking the First Order Condition yields:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \max_x E[U_M(Peace)] &= (\alpha x^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}})(1 - x) \\
 x_s^* &= \frac{1}{1 + \epsilon}
 \end{aligned}$$

Check the Second Order Condition, $\frac{d^2}{d^2x} = 0$. Since the Second Order Condition results in an ambiguous check of concavity, one can check $EU_M(Peace)$ visually to ensure it is a concave function and that the First Order Condition is a maximum. It is so long as $\epsilon > 0$.

Figure A4: Concavity of $EU_M(Peace)$



□


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Appendix B - Grant Coding and Recipient Identification

Visual Example of Grant

Figure A5: Grant to the Abbot and Convent of Selby to Hold a Market



Source: University of Houston, O'Quinn Law Library - Patent Rolls Henry III, Volume 2, Membrane 4; and Calendar of the Patent Rolls Henry III 1247 - 1258.

A Note on Dates, Entry Indentations, and Entry Classifications

I follow the following criteria when determining how to classify distinct entries from *CChR*, *CPR*, and *LP*. Entries are separated by complete line breaks followed by a paragraph indentation. Note that for the elite-level analysis, grants are separated by the number of recipients. Entries that distribute a grant and then demand another party to deliver the good remain together in the same entry, though they have two different main actors. In those cases, the person receiving the goods, not the one instructed to deliver it, is the grant's recipient.

However, some entries solely demand an actor perform an action or deliver a good. In those cases, the demanded actor is the grant recipient.

In the *Letters and Papers* of Henry VIII and later patents of Elizabeth I, long lists of recipients of grants like church positions, protection, pensions, rights to alienate property, etc. are transcribed in long lists. In these cases, I separate out each case into a unique entry with a unique recipient.

Types of Grant Recipients

I categorize each grant into one of individuals; hospitals; merchants; misc groups (lepers, residents of a forest, tinmen of Devon); religious institutions (abbeys, convents); towns (includes citizens of an entire town and counties); burgesses; and other (full Latin text, no specific recipient identified). I further categorize individuals as secular or non-secular (abbots, priors, chaplains, bishops) depending on their identified title in the grant. Should a grant identify two or more recipient classifications, the grant is coded for the largest of the classifications. For burgesses > merchants, religious group > misc group, and town > individual.

Defintions of Distributed Goods

Land

Land grants can include grants of manors, farmland, forests, religious buildings, etc., and permissions to alter buildings, pastures, forests, etc. All noble titles as are coded as land grants as well.

Example

From the Charter Rolls of Edward III on July 20, 1372:

“Grant of the county, castle, town and honour of Richmond with all appurtenances to John, duke of Brittany and count of Montfortand Joan his wife, the king’s kinswoman, and the heirs of the body of the said John. [Registrum Honoris da Richmond, p. 192.]”

From the Charter Rolls of Henry VI on January 20, 1448:

“Grant, of special grace, to John Norys, esquire, of power to enclose 600 acres of land and wood of his demesne lands and woods in Yattingden, Wele and Firmisham and to make a park and warren of them and with stone, sand and mortar (calce) to fortify his manor there with turrets, battlements and machicolations and to hold the said manor, park and warren to him and his heirs forever.”

Land Alteration

This is a subset of the general *land* variable indicating entries allowing a recipient to alter land or buildings they already own. The three most common entries of land alteration include permission to enclose land, to impark land, and to crenelate manors.

Example

From the Charter Rolls of Henry VI on January 20, 1448:

“Grant, of special grace, to John Norys, esquire, of power to enclose 600 acres of land and wood of his demesne lands and woods in Yattingden, Wele and Firmisham and to make a park and warren of them and with stone, sand and mortar (calce) to fortify his manor there with turrets, battlements and machicolations and to hold the said manor, park and warren to him and his heirs for ever.”

Land Accumulation

This is a subset of the general *land* variable indicating if the recipient is accumulating land or buildings. In other words, the recipient adds physical land or buildings to their existing holdings. Additionally, I code cases where a recipient gains access to land like “common pasture” as land accumulation, but not cases where the entry grants free warren. All noble titles as are coded as land accumulation. Warships are also considered land accumulation so long as the grant specifically mentions land as part of the wardship.

Example

From the Charter Rolls of Edward III on July 20, 1372:

“Grant of the county, castle, town and honour of Richmond with all appurtenances to John, duke of Brittany and count of Montfort and Joan his wife, the king’s kinswoman, and the heirs of the body of the said John. [Registrum Honoris da Richmond, p. 192.]”

Markets, Fairs, or Festivals

Entries that grant or license the right for the recipient to hold a market, fair, or festival will explicitly grant permissions for hosting the particular event along with the dates the recipient is allowed to hold the particular event. *Consider adding in clerks of markets as gaining markets (right now 7.24.26 clerks are considered positions)

Example

From the Charter Rolls of Henry IV on April 18, 1401:

“Grant, of special grace, and with the assent of the council, to John Weston and Margaret his wife, and their heirs, of a weekly market on Saturday at their town of Bourgh in le Mersshe, co. Lincoln, and of two yearly fairs there, one on the vigil, the day and the morrow of St. Peter in the Chair, and the other on the vigil, the day and the morrow of SS. Peter and Paul.”

Positions (Government)

Government positions are typically letters patent that grant a position or office belonging to the government or king. These positions can range from Chancellor of the Exchequer to Royal Cup Bearer. Many positions relate directly to the monarch’s estates: painter, groundskeeper, steward, keeper, etc. For the purposes of this categorization, these “minor” positions involving the king and his estates will be considered government positions. Key words that designate government positions are “office and custody” and/or “with fees/with wages.”

Powers to do something on behalf of the king are also considered government positions, unless those powers fall into a different variable category (i.e., land alteration or alienation of property). Appointments to keep or manage royal property on behalf of the king are also considered government positions as they are functionally similar to stewards.

Example

From the Patent Rolls of Edward IV on July 1, 1461:

“Grant, during good behavior, to Thomas Croxton of the offices of coroner and attorney of the king in the King’s Bench, receiving the usual fees a the Exchequer.”

and from the Patent Rolls of Edward IV on July 8, 1461:

“Grant, during pleasure, to the king’s servant John Stratford of the office of the king’s painter, with fees and livery as above.”

Exclusions

There are some justifications for excluding an entry from analyses with this goods data. The clearest case to exclude an entry is if the entry is a duplicate in either the Charter Rolls or the Patent Rolls. Entries sometimes have clarifying text at the end of them indicating duplication (e.g., “Vacated because otherwise on the roll of patents of this year.”). Other times, an entry might appear twice within a page or two of the same roll. In the case of duplicates, entries

are only excluded if their duplicates reside within the rolls of interest (Charter Rolls, Patent Rolls, or Letters and Papers of Henry VIII). Some entries say “Vacated because otherwise on the Close Rolls, Wardrobe Rolls, etc.” The dataset retains those entries. Additionally, entry fragments that are either unintelligible or do not contain enough information to code for a particular good type are excluded.

Example

From the Charter Rolls of Henry VI there is no year nor date:

“Unfinished charter in favour of Hugh Pakenham and Constance , his wife.”

Geolocation

For the county-level analysis, I geolocate manor; castle; and market, fair, and festival grants to English counties. This process excludes grants within Wales, Scotland, and Ireland.

Manors

Many entries contain county indications for grants of manors. However, earlier grants, particularly those during the reign of Henry III and Edward I are less likely to list specific counties. To identify counties for those manors, I compiled a complete list of manors with records found in the British National Archives. I then compared the grant manor and similar spellings to the full manor list. For example, grant ID 7702536 lists Colingburn, but is spelled Collingbourne in the full manor list. Manors not in the full manor list are not geocoded, as well as names where there are multiple possible manor matches without enough contextual information to narrow down the match to a unique county. For example, grant ID 7701228 distributed in 1234 during the reign of Henry III identifies “the manor of Compton”. Seven Compton Manors exist in the full manor list. Dating the available documents of each Compton Manor, there are two possibilities for the Compton Manor distributed in 1234: Compton Manor in Sussex or Compton Manor in Warwickshire. In this case, the grant cannot be geolocated to a specific county.

Appendix C - Second Barons' War

Characteristics of Elite Royalists and Rebels

Individual conflict data for rebels during the Second Barons' War (1264 - 1266) come from the appendix of (Blaauw, 1871, p. 364 - 380). It appears that Blaauw's editor formed the list from a variety of Blaauw's notes and supplemental sources. Blaauw identifies 575 earls, barons, and gentry and marks them as royalists, rebellions, neutral, or unaccounted for. There are a 77 nobles excluded due to being too old, too young, out of the country, or there is uncertainty about their participation. Tables C1, C2, and C3 provides summary statistics for the rebels and royalists. There is a skew towards rebels in the list due to the methodologies employed to identify individuals. Blaauw and his editor compile the list of rebels from various historical sources: chronicles from contemporary historians, genealogical records, lawsuits, judicial proceedings, and records of confiscated property of rebels after the war. Since the list relies on lawsuits and judicial proceedings, and those proceedings involved treason trials, it follows that rebels make up a large proportion of names from those sources.

Table C1: Summary Statistics of Elites in the Second Barons' War (1263 - 1265) from Blaauw (1871)

VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max
Royalist	498	0.269	0.444	0	1
Rebel	498	0.729	0.445	0	1
Earl	498	0.0261	0.160	0	1
Related to Simon de Montfort	498	0.0100	0.0998	0	1
Related to Henry III	498	0.0161	0.126	0	1
Original Confederate in 1258	498	0.0100	0.0998	0	1
Manor(s)	498	0.143	1.375	0	20
Castle(s)	498	0.0522	0.569	0	9
Land Grant(s)	498	0.281	1.951	0	26
Non-Land Grant(s)	498	0.424	1.633	0	23

Table C2: Summary Statistics of Royalists in Second Barons' War (1263 - 1265) from [Blaauw \(1871\)](#)

VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max
Earl	134	0.0448	0.208	0	1
Related to Simon de Montfort	134	0.00746	0.0864	0	1
Related to Henry III	134	0.0299	0.171	0	1
Original Confederate in 1258	134	0.00746	0.0864	0	1
Manor(s)	134	0.473	2.616	0	20
Castle(s)	134	0.179	1.082	0	9
Land Grant(s)	134	0.858	3.621	0	26
Non-Land Grant(s)	134	0.910	2.738	0	23

Table C3: Summary Statistics of Rebels in Second Barons' War (1263 - 1265) from [Blaauw \(1871\)](#)

VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max
Earl	363	0.0165	0.128	0	1
Related to Simon de Montfort	363	0.0110	0.105	0	1
Related to Henry III	363	0.0110	0.105	0	1
Original Confederate in 1258	363	0.0110	0.105	0	1
Manor(s)	363	0.0220	0.165	0	2
Castle(s)	363	0.00551	0.0741	0	1
Land Grant(s)	363	0.0689	0.491	0	8
Non-Land Grant(s)	363	0.245	0.888	0	8

Comparisons to Other Datasets

I cross-reference this rebel/royalists dataset with [Valente \(2017\)](#) who reports summary statistics on a larger sample of rebels for the Second Barons' War. [Valente \(2017\)](#) identifies 1850 rebels who participated in the Second Barons' War and randomly samples 15 percent of the rebels to identify status characteristics (e.g., earl, baron, clergy, etc.). Earls comprise 0.4 percent of Valente's sample of rebels, while earls comprise 2.61 percent of Blaauw's rebels. Barons comprise 1.8 percent of Valente's sample. This comparison indicates that Blaauw's list might overcount high-ranking rebels. However, in the context of the elite-driven nature of the Second Barons' War, earls play a key role in the conflict and are the main theoretical actors.

Royalist vs. Rebel Grant Distributions during Henry III's Reign

Figure C1: Manor Distributions During Henry III's Reign






Figure C2: Castle Distributions During Henry III's Reign



Elite-Level Analysis Robustness Checks


Outlier Elites

Figure C3: Land Grant (Cont.) and Probability of Elite Rebel Status Excluding Each Elite



Coefficients are in green and the 95 percent confidence interval is bounded in blue.

Figure C4: Land Grant (Binary) and Probability of Elite Rebel Status Excluding Each Elite



Coefficients are in green and the 95 percent confidence interval is bounded in blue.

Elite-Level Placebo Tests

Table C4: Non-Land Grant Placebo Tests

VARIABLES	Continuous Treatment		
	Joining Rebellion	Joining Rebellion	Joining Rebellion
Land Alterations	-0.00119 (0.0912)	-0.0290 (0.100)	-0.00795 (0.107)
Markets, Fairs, and Festivals	-0.126*** (0.0351)	-0.106** (0.0531)	-0.0404 (0.0913)
Observations	498	498	498
R-squared	0.028	0.055	0.057
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Other Grants	No	No	Yes
Treated - Land Alterations/MFF	16/50	16/50	16/50

Controls include binary indicators for: earl status, member of Henry III's family, member of Simon de Montfort's family, and if the elite was an original baron confederate instigating the Provision of Oxford in 1258. Controls also account for a continuous measure of land grants. Other grants include a continuous count of the following grants: pardons of crimes; pardons of service; tax relief; marriage approvals; monopoly rights; government positions; church positions; military positions; noble titles; rights to alienate property; free warren; protection; cash, policing power; goods and chattles of felons; denization; commissions; wardships; bonds and loans; misc. goods; and demands. Clustered standard errors by elite ID are in parentheses where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.

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Appendix D - Medieval Conflicts Data

Civil Conflicts

County-Level Rebellion Data

From 1226 to 1572, England experienced 32 unique rebellions. I rely on a mixture of military historians, English historians, and medievalists to indicate the start and end months of specific rebellions. For lengthy rebellions, specifically the War of the Roses, I break the conflict down into distinct phases as actors from different counties rebelled at various times during the 30-year war.

Table [D3](#) lists each rebellion in the dataset along with the months of rebellion, the rebelling counties, and the source from which both the dates and rebelling counties derive. Large-scale civil wars like the Second Baron's War and, to a lesser extent, the Lollard Uprising and the Rebellions of the Commonwealth, drew support from all over the country. However, the referenced historians attributed the concentration of rebels to specific counties or larger regions within England (e.g., the East for the Second Barons' War). Notice that conflicts with Ireland, Wales, and Scotland do not count as rebellion, as during this time period England did not have consistent control over these regions, and those areas functioned more as colonial entities than full-fledged parts of the kingdom. The only exception to this is the Rebellion of the Marches, which involved both Welsh and English counties. Thus, the Rebellion of the Marches counts as both a civil and international conflict (see Table [D4](#)).

Table D1: English Rebellions 1226-1572

War	Dates of Conflict	Rebelling Counties	Sources
Second Baron's War	Apr. 1264 - Dec. 1266	Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Cambridgeshire, Derbyshire, Essex, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Kent, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, London/Middlesex, Norfolk, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Rutland, Suffolk, Surrey, Sussex, Warwickshire	Blaauw (1871) ; Phillips and Axelrod (2005) ; Jobson (2012, 2016) ; Ambler (2019) ; Carpenter (2023)
Rebellion of the Marches	Dec. 1321 - Mar. 1322	Gloucestershire, Herefordshire, Shropshire, Staffordshire, Worcestershire	Waugh (1977)
Peasants' Revolt/Wat Tyler's Rebellion	Jun. 1381	Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Kent, London/Middlesex, Norfolk, Northamptonshire, Suffolk, Surrey, Sussex, Yorkshire	Goodman (2007) ; Kohn (2013) ; Xu (2022)
Lord's Appellant	Dec. 1387	Derbyshire, Essex, Gloucestershire, Lancashire, Nottinghamshire, Surrey, Warwickshire	Tuck (2011)
Henry of Bolingbroke's Revolt	Jul. - Aug. 1399	Nottinghamshire, Yorkshire	Kohn (2013) ; Bennett (2003) ; Mortimer (2008)
Epiphany Rising	Jan. 1400	Huntingdonshire, Kent, Wiltshire	Dunn (2003)
Percys Rebellion	Jul. 1403	Northumberland	Phillips and Axelrod (2005)
Rebellion of Archbishop Scrope of York	May 1405	Yorkshire	McNiven (1971) ; Dupuy and Dupuy (1977)
Lollard Uprising	Jan. 1414	Bedfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Derbyshire, Essex, Gloucestershire, Hertfordshire, Leicestershire, Northampton, Somerset, Warwickshire, Worcestershire	Knightly (1975) ; Jurkowski (2013)
Cheshire Tax Revolt	Jul. - Oct. 1416	Cheshire	Bennett (2013)

Table D2: English Rebellions 1226-1572 Cont.

War	Dates of Conflict	Rebelling Counties	Sources
Jack Cade's Rebellion	Jun. - Jul. 1450	Kent, Sussex	Phillips and Axelrod (2005)
John and William Milford's Uprising	Oct. 1450 - Mar. 1451	Kent, Sussex	Mate (1992)
War of the Roses	1455-1485		
<i>First Phase</i>	May 1455 - Feb. 1456	Norfolk, Suffolk, Warwickshire, Yorkshire	Phillips and Axelrod (2005) ; Dupuy and Dupuy (1977) ; Hicks (2003, 2010)
<i>Second Phase</i>	Sep. 1459 - Mar. 1461	Kent, Northumberland, Yorkshire	Hicks (2003, 2010)
<i>Third Phase - Northumbrian Resistance</i>	May 1464	Northumberland	Hicks (2003, 2010)
<i>Fourth Phase - Warwick's Rebellion</i>	Jul. 1469 - May 1471	Kent, Lincolnshire, Yorkshire	Phillips and Axelrod (2005) ; Kohn (2013) ; Hicks (2010)
<i>Fifth Phase - Buckingham's Revolt</i>	Oct. 1483	Kent	Phillips and Axelrod (2005)
<i>Sixth Phase - Invasion of Henry Tudor</i>	Aug. 1485	Cheshire, Lancashire	Dupuy and Dupuy (1977) ; Hicks (2010)
Stafford and Lovell Rebellion	Apr. - May 1486	Worcestershire	Williams (1928)
Simnel Rebellion	Jun. 1487	Lancashire	MacCulloch and Fletcher (2020)

Table D3: English Rebellions 1226-1572 Cont.

D4

War	Dates of Conflict	Rebelling Counties	Sources
Yorkshire Rebellion	Apr. 1489	Yorkshire	MacCulloch (2020) and Fletcher (2020)
Cornish Rebellion	Jun. 1497	Cornwall, Somerset	Arthurson (1987); MacCulloch and Fletcher (2020)
The Second Cornish Rebellion	Sep. 1497	Cornwall	MacCulloch (2020) and Fletcher (2020)
Amicable Grant	May 1523	Essex, Suffolk	MacCulloch (1986); MacCulloch and Fletcher (2020)
Lincolnshire Uprising	Oct. 1536	Lincolnshire	MacCulloch (2020) and Fletcher (2020)
Pilgrimage of Grace	Oct. - Dec. 1537	Cumberland, Durham, Lancashire, Westmorland, Yorkshire	MacCulloch (2020) and Fletcher (2020)
Bigod's Rebellion	Jan. - Feb. 1537	Cumberland, Durham, Westmorland, Yorkshire	MacCulloch (2020) and Fletcher (2020)
Prayerbook Rebellion/Western Rising	Apr. 1547 - Aug. 1549	Cornwall, Devon	MacCulloch (2020) and Fletcher (2020)
Rebellions of Commonwealth	Mar. 1549 - Oct. 1550	Buckinghamshire, Essex, Gloucestershire, Kent, Leicestershire, Norfolk, Northamptonshire, Oxfordshire, Rutland, Somerset, Suffolk, Wiltshire	MacCulloch (2020) and Fletcher (2020)
Northumberland Rebellion	Jul. 1553	Northumberland	Loades (1996)
Wyatt's Rebellion	Mar. 1553 - Feb. 1554	Devon, Herefordshire, Kent, Leicestershire	MacCulloch (2020) and Fletcher (2020)
Rising of the North	Nov. - Dec. 1569	Cumberland, Durham, Northumberland	MacCulloch (2020) and Fletcher (2020)


Constrained Monarchs, Stable Bargains

Frequency and Distribution of Rebellions

Comparisons to Other Datasets

As a validation exercise for this new English monthly rebellion dataset, I can compare the number of years of civil conflict to a frequently used data source on historical conflict in Europe, [Kokkonen and Sundell \(2020\)](#). Since [Kokkonen and Sundell \(2020\)](#) only considers years of conflict, I aggregate the monthly data into yearly data and present the relative counts below in Figure D1. There is one minor and one major discrepancy. This data set has a handful of fewer cases of civil war onset, but far fewer years of civil conflict. Since [Kokkonen and Sundell \(2020\)](#) do not provide information on the exact conflicts that make up their dataset, the large discrepancy in civil war years is likely due to the inclusion of Ireland, Wales, and Scotland into their civil conflict count. Another potential discrepancy is due to the breakup of the War of the Roses into phases. While I consider each phase as a unique conflict, which reduces the total number of civil conflict years, it is likely [Kokkonen and Sundell \(2020\)](#) considers the full 30-year period of constant conflict.

Figure D1: Comparison of Datasets: Number of Years of English Civil Conflict (1226 - 1572)



International Conflicts

To account for an alternative explanation of the distribution of goods in the county-level analysis—support after exposure to conflict from foreign adversaries—the dataset includes a foreign exposure variable. To construct this variable, I identify all foreign conflicts involving England from 1226 to 1572. I then identify the antagonist of each conflict and code if a given English county was exposed to foreign conflict in a given year based on the counties

location. For example, if England is at war with France, counties along the English Channel and southern coast are considered exposed during conflict years. I rely on the international wars in the [Kokkonen and Sundell \(2020\)](#) dataset and the underlying texts the authors used to create their dataset ([Kohn, 2013](#); [Dupuy and Dupuy, 1977](#); [Phillips and Axelrod, 2005](#)) Table [D4](#) lists all international conflicts, their years, and England’s antagonist in the war.

There are many cases where if England was at war with France, Scotland would ally with France and launch strikes across the northern English border. While the fighting might fall under an umbrella of a single large conflict, cases like this are broken into their constituent parts, as fighting often did not begin simultaneously. A good example of this is the War of the Holy League and the Anglo-Scottish War.

Additionally, cases of isolated conflict sometimes involved indirect support from other nations. For example, during the English Invasion of Scotland, France provided Scotland with substantial troops. Cases like this are coded as only Scotland as the antagonist because England was simultaneously at war with France via the Italian War. Only where a country is in direct conflict with England does it count as conflict with that country. Mercenaries do not count.

Table D4: English International Wars 1226 - 1572

War	Dates of Conflict	Antagonist Countries	Date Sources
Anglo-French War	Jan. 1242 - Aug. 1243	France	Wikipedia
Conquest of Wales	Jun. 1282 - Jun. 1283	Wales	Wikipedia
Anglo-French War	Jun. 1294 - Mar. 1298	France	Wikipedia
Scottish War	Mar. - Apr. 1296	Scotland	Wikipedia
Wallace's Revolt	May 1297 - Aug. 1305	Scotland	Wikipedia
Anglo-French War	May 1300 - May 1303	France	Wikipedia
Bruce's Revolt	Jun. 1306 - Jun. 1314	Scotland	Wikipedia
Scottish War	Jun. 1314 - May 1328	Scotland	Wikipedia
Rebellion of the Marches	Dec. 1321 - Mar. 1322	Wales (also a civil conflict)	Waugh (1977)
Scottish War	Aug. 1332 - Jul. 1333	Scotland	Wikipedia
Hundred Years' War -Edwardian Phase	Oct. 1337 - Apr. 1360	France, Majorca, Navarre, Castile	Wikipedia
War of Breton Succession	Apr. 1341 - Apr. 1365	France	Wikipedia
Hundred Years' War - Caroline Phase	May 1369 - Jul. 1389	France, Castile	Wikipedia
English Invasion of Scotland	Jul. - Aug. 1385	Scotland	Wikipedia
English Conflict with Scotland	Aug. 1388	Scotland	Wikipedia

Table D5: English International Wars 1226 - 1572 Cont.

War	Dates of Conflict	Antagonist Countries	Date Sources
Richard II's First Invasion of Ireland	Oct. 1394 - May 1395	Ireland	Egan (2018)
Richard II's Second Invasion of Ireland	Jun. - Oct. 1399	Ireland	Egan (2018)
English Invasion of Scotland	Jun. - Aug. 1400	Scotland	Wikipedia
Revolt of Owen Glendower	Sep. 1400 - Sep. 1415	Wales	Wikipedia
Hundred Years' War - Lancastrian War	Aug. 1415 - Oct. 1453	France	Wikipedia
Anglo-Hanseatic War	Jun. 1468 - Aug. 1474	Hanseatic League	Lloyd (1987)
Anglo-French War	Jun. - Aug. 1475	France	Wikipedia
Anglo-Scottish War	Jul. - Aug. 1482	Scotland	Wikipedia
English Invasion of Scotland	Jul. 1484	Scotland	Wikipedia
Henry VII's First Invasion of Brittany*	Jul. 1488	France	Wikipedia
Henry VII's Second Invasion of Brittany	Feb. 1489 - Nov. 1492	France	Wikipedia
Warbeck's Rebellion with Burgundy Support [†]	Jul. 1495	Burgundy	Wikipedia
Warbeck's Rebellion with Scottish Support ⁺	Sep. 1496 - Oct. 1497	Scotland	Wikipedia
War of the Holy League	Nov. 1511 - Aug. 1514	France, Ferrara, Florence, Navarre	Wikipedia

*Henry VII did not send troops to engage in the conflict in Brittany, but English fighters left to join the conflict under Edward Woodville. [†] Warbeck landed in Kent. ⁺ Warbeck landed in Cornwall.


Table D6: English International Wars 1226 - 1572 Cont.

War	Dates of Conflict	Antagonist Countries	Date Sources
Anglo-Scottish War	Aug. - Sep. 1513	Scotland	Clodfelter (2017)
First Italian War	May 1521 - Jan. 1525	France, Venice, Switzerland	Phillips and Axelrod (2005)
English Invasion of Scotland	Sep. 1522 - Sep. 1524	Scotland	Murphy (2023)
Second Italian War	Apr. 1527 - Aug. 1529	Holy Roman Empire, Spain, Ferrara, Genoa, Mantua	Wikipedia
Irish Rebellion/Kildare Rebellion	Jun. 1534 - Oct. 1536	Ireland	Wikipedia
Anglo-French War	Jul. 1542 - Jun. 1546	France	Wikipedia
Anglo-Scottish War	Nov. 1542 - Mar. 1550	Scotland	Clodfelter (2017)
Anglo-French War	Aug. 1549 - May 1550	France	Phillips and Axelrod (2005)
Anglo-French War	Apr. 1557 - Jul. 1558	France	Wikipedia
Conflict with Scotland	Feb. - Jul. 1560	Scotland	Wikipedia
English Expeditions to France	May 1562 - Jul. 1563	France	Wikipedia
Trade Conflict with Spain	Sep. 1568	Spain	Wikipedia

Frequency and Distribution of International War

Unlike [Kokkonen and Sundell \(2020\)](#), this dataset considers conflicts with Ireland, Wales, and Scotland international conflicts. England warred with France quite often, followed by Scotland. Thus, English southern coastal counties and northern counties were most exposed to non-civil conflicts and were more likely to receive aid from the monarch.


Figure D2: England Years of International War with Other States (1226 - 1572)



Comparisons to Other Datasets

To validate this new metric, I can compare this dataset's years and onsets of English international war with [Kokkonen and Sundell \(2020\)](#). See Table D3. Notice that while the number of onsets is nearly identical, there is a large discrepancy in years of international conflict. Since [Kokkonen and Sundell \(2020\)](#) do not identify the names of conflicts in their dataset, speculation is necessary. The discrepancy is likely due to the break up of the Hundred Year War into phases rather than continuously counting each year from the first instance of violence. The Hundred Year War produced many peace treaties between England and France, temporarily ending hostilities, at least nominally. Not accounting for these breaks would bias the measure of international conflict exposure toward counties being exposed to conflict when conflict, in reality, is much less likely.

Figure D3: Comparison of Datasets: Number of Years of English International Conflict (1226 - 1572)



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Appendix E - County-Level Analysis

Panel View of County Treatment Status

Figure E1: Panel View of Manor Treatment Status in Figure 8






Figure E2: Panel View of Castle Treatment Status in Figure 8



Various Treatment Persistence Levels


Figure E3: Impact of Land Grant Distribution on County Rebellion (No Monarch Reset)



E3


No Monarch Reset

Figure E4: Impact of Land Grant Distribution on County Rebellion (No Monarch Reset)




Lower Binary Treatment Threshold

Figure E5: Impact of Land Grant Distribution on County Rebellion (50th Percentile Cutoff)



Market, Fair, and Festival Grants Placebo Test

Figure E6: Impact of Market, Fair, and Festival Grant Distribution on County Rebellion



Henry III County-Level Results

Figure E7: Impact of Manor and Castle Grants on County Rebellion during the Reign of Henry III

